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COMMERCIAL LAUNCH SERVICES - 
THE KEY TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS FOR SPACE PROJECTS
Dee Ann Divis
Manager Washington Operations 
Third Millennium, Inc. 
Washington DC
ABSTRACT
Space projects have been experiencing 
crippling difficulties in getting access to 
private capital markets. As launch operations 
move from public management to the tougher 
'real world 1 , competition will generate 
increased access to space, better launch 
operations and lower project costs. These 
changes will dramatically improve the cash 
flow projections and risks of space projects, 
enabling them to gain access to capital.
This paper will give examples of how launch 
delays can devastate the rate of return on a 
project. It will also illustrate how fast 
turnaround can be used to reduce costs and the 
effect of competition on payload prices.
INTRODUCTION
All in the space industry agree that, 
eventually, space will be filled with activity 
fueled by self-sustaining commercial 
enterprises. Such a shift is desirable   in 
fact, essential. Lack of public support for 
the space program has made Congressional 
support increasing tenuous. The ability of 
the government to finance space activity in 
the face of the budget cutting is in question.
But while public financing stumbles, private 
financing concludes spectacular deals. 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company put together 
a $24.53 billion buyout of RJR Nabisco Inc. 
The deal quite likely took less than a year. 
Who in our industry would not like to be able 
to pull together $24 billion committed dollars 
in under a year?
The resources needed for space are there and 
we are already seeing the power of the purse 
change hands from the government to the 
private sector. Unfortunately, the transition 
has been a rough one. There is a tremendous 
amount of money to be made in space, but
relatively limited amounts of private capital 
have been put forth. This is because space 
ventures have never really operated under 
business standards. Costs are astronomical 
relative to function. The growth rate of 
those costs is equally unacceptable   easily 
surpassing the 11% per year that aviation has 
been posting since World War II. No 
commercial industry can stand this kind of 
cost growth and stay competitive. Nor would 
any commercial industry put up with the 
cavalier treatment of schedules that we see in 
aerospace. The aerospace industry has been 
able to get away with this mode of operation 
because it has been living in a federally 
funded wonderland where real-world costs don't 
matter. As federal funds dry up and aerospace 
companies search for private money, the 
aerospace industry is going to have to change 
its ways.
Fortunately, the continuing commercialization 
of the launch industry has given the industry 
a leg up. Competition among the private 
launch services should induce three keys 
changes in the industry: greater access, 
improved operations, and lower costs. These 
changes are sufficiently powerful to change 
the cash flow projections of space projects 
and enable then to compete successfully for 
private capital.
INCREASED ACCESS
The advantage of increased access is obvious. 
Private space facilities like CDSF are 
worthless without the sure ability to get 
there. With Space Industries' Industrial 
Space Facility the question of whether there 
would be transport available at all was one of 
their biggest barriers to getting funding. No 
project will get funding if the access is even 
in question.
What many people fail to realize is that just 
.being able to get to space is not good enough.
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Transportation must also be reliable. 
Launches must be made on time, consistently.
IMPROVED OPERATIONS
To understand clearly why this is so important 
you need to look at the costs a payload 
customer incurs when he is delayed. Waiting 
costs in two ways: you are either paying 
someone to help you wait or someone is not 
getting your services and, therefore, is not 
paying you. For a typical Delta class 
communications satellite with 24 transponders 
a delay would cause out-of-pocket expenses 
that include storing the satellite, insuring 
it while in storage and paying the staff while 
they wait. There is also lost revenue    
approximately $100,000 a day.
ESTIMATED COSTS OF DELAY
$ 12,000 
52,500
$1,200,000 
132,800
DIRECT OUT-QFHPQGKET EXPENSES 
Storage (ref 1) 
Insurance (ref 2) 
Staff (ref 3)
Financing Charge (ref 4)
LOST REVENUE '
1 yr at $100,000/day (ref 5) $36 3 500,OOP
TOTAL LOSS IN Oil, YEAR $37,89? ,300 
References
1) Storage estimat:ed at $ 1,,.000 per month 
2 ) P1 ex indu s t ry spokesman, es t ima ted p r em i urn 
would be *015% of the value of the
hardware. Hardware estimated to be worth
$35 million
3) Staff estimated at 10 man-years at a fully 
1 o ad ed, ra t e of $ 1 2 0,0 0 0 p e r1 man y e a r (i.e. 
s a la r y + b ene f i, t s f ov er h ead, rent etc.)
4) Prime rate of 10*5% and total expenses of 
$1,264,500
5) For a 24 transponder, BeIta class satellite
The direct loss is $37.9 million. 'This is 
certainly substantial. It does not indicate, 
however, the true impact of the delay. That 
impact is better shown by the change in the 
project's expected rate of return.
THE EFFECT OF DELAY ON. RATE OF RETURN
Investments 'have many features and those
looking for opportunities shop around much 
like they would for a car. The rate of return 
indicates the level of profit an investor 
expects to make and is the primary selling 
point* There are always more people looking 
for money than there is money available. So a 
company must offer enough of a profit ~ a 
high enough rate of return   to beat out the 
competi ti on for fund s«
The rate of return required to coax an 
investor into a deal is determined by the risk 
he runs of losing his money. The higher the 
risk the higher the rate of return. For 
example, on an insured savings account you 
might earn 5% per year. Thirty year treasury 
bills, also a very safe bet, presently pay 
8.8%. Stocks have an average risk return 
which translates to about 18% today. Venture 
capitalists   the reasonable ones   may ask 
35%.
Rates as high as 50%-70% have been suggested 
for this industry. This may well be true for 
less established segments of the industry such 
as materials processing. Our example falls in 
the well established telecommunications 
industry. A reasonable, though highly 
simplified, guess at the rate of return for 
this project is 42%.
At high rates such as these the money you get 
in the beginning is worth a lot more than the 
money you get later on. This growth so 
powerful that a 1 year delay on this project 
reduces the return from 42% to about 31%. 
With a two year delay the return drops to 
around 25%. It would actually be better to 
lose several years off the life of the 
satellite entirely than to permit a year's 
delay in launch.
As noted, higher rates are required for less 
proven segments of the industry. This is part 
of a double handicap for materials processing 
efforts   one of.the greatest potential 
growth areas. They must pay higher rates to 
get investors and they, more than any other 
segment of the industry, are subject to delay. 
Much of what the companies want to do must be 
preceded by direct experimentation. Thus, 
before they have a chance to generate any 
revenue, they have to launch a number of times
  and every launch carries the risk of 
pushing back the entire time table. 3M found 
itself with a 21 month gap in its experiment 
schedule because of the Challenger accident.
Delay presents other problems as well. It 
increases the risk of proprietary data leaks 
or competitive technological progress. At 
least one materials processing venture was 
abandoned because of concern about protecting 
proprietary data. McDonnell Douglas, after 
years of space research, found its 
achievements outstripped by bioengineering.
Investors are quite aware of the problems and, 
with very few exceptions, there is no capital 
to be found for materials processing right now
  and for precious few other space ventures 
as well. What activity there is being 
internally financed or financed by individual 
investors with a personal interest in space. 
The institutional investors, where the really
 big money is, are waiting on the*side lines.
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Fortunately, as the aerospace industry shifts 
to commercial operation, the demand for on- 
time launches and shorter lead times is making 
itself felt. We are seeing the beginnings of 
time-conscious operations with commercial 
launchers now using scheduling to competitive 
advantage. At least one of the three large 
launch service companies is operating with 
forfeitable money incentives for on-time 
launches. Among the smaller firms, lead times 
as short as 6 months for a launch are being 
attempted.
My firm Third Millennium Inc., also known as 
MMI, places special emphasis on launch 
operations. Though we do not feel that we 
will need any help in competing on a cost 
basis, we are working on a special time- 
conscious approach to manifesting. This 
approach, called an open manifest, has 
programmed gaps for back-up flights. Should a 
launch be delayed for any reason the payload 
is shifted into one of these gaps. Emergency 
flights are possible and last minute payloads 
can be fitted in   almost like flying stand 
by. In this case, however, you can launch a 
full payload of 1,500 to 3,000 kgs not just a 
Get-Away-Special.
This level of operation is, of course, not 
possible with an expendable launch vehicle. 
The Space Van system is a fully reusable 
shuttle system. First launch is set for 1994. 
The Space Van is entirely privately funded and 
is not connected with the NASA shuttle 
program. The system uses off-the-shelf 
hardware and a proprietary heat .shield in a 
design specifically geared toward fast 
turnaround. We will be starting off with 
three sets of launcher/boosters each with a 
turnaround goal of a week.
Such dramatic drops in lead times can lead to 
unexpected new ways of doing business. For 
example, if you can get an emergency launch, 
it would likely be more cost effective not to 
launch a back-up satellite until it is needed. 
You save the cost of the launch up front. You 
also save on launch insurance. Rates for 
launch insurance have run as high as 20%. If 
the satellite in our example cost $35 million 
that is an insurance premium of $7 million. 
If your launch cost was $50 million that's a 
total $57 million saved if you never have to 
launch.
Interruptions in broadcast service can be 
covered by business interruption insurance or 
lease arrangements for back-up transponders. 
We may eventually see satellite companies 
provide themselves with back-up capability by 
joining together to finance a single extra 
satellite.
REDUCED LAUNCH COSTS
The backlog of payloads has made life easy for 
the launch companies. As competition, gets 
tougher, however, they will be forced into 
tighter and tighter operation. Competition, 
particularly from overseas, will also force 
launch prices down. Further reductions will 
be possible with the introduction of new 
vehicles.
The new vehicles -- proposed by MMI, Amroc, 
SSI and others -- hold the real promise. They 
are not old missiles refitted for new jobs but 
are specifically designed for commercial needs 
and operations. MMI believes it is possible 
to drop launch costs to $1,300 per kilogram to 
LEO and $12,000 per kilogram to GEO (1989 
dollars). After having interacted with 
several of the major aerospace companies on 
our designs, we are sufficiently confident in 
our project to offer those prices on fixed 
price contracts. For our satellite example, 
such a drop in GEO launch costs would boost 
the rate of return to 62%. Even the stuffiest 
investment house should be interested in that.
Nearly all of the proposed new vehicles are 
small and plan to achieve economies through 
high flight rates. From a launcher 
perspective this approach is desirable because 
small vehicles are easier to finance. From a 
user perspective this approach will provide 
many fight alternatives and considerable 
flexibility. A single very large launcher 
would have to wait to gather enough payloads 
to make a launch economical. Every delay for 
every payload becomes a delay for them all. 
At the present level of activity it would take 
considerable time to fill a flight making it 
even harder to sell.
Being able to fly when you want is extremely 
valuable, especially if what you want to do is 
fly more frequently. The cost of capital is 
so high that the sooner you can get your 
project done the better off you are. Our 
sample satellite project experienced a loss of 
11% and tens of millions of dollars because of 
a one year delay. If you could complete the 
same project one year in advance, you would 
get just as significant a gain. Moving 
schedules up for materials processing projects 
would generate comparable gains. The jump in 
the rate of return is tremendous. When you 
combine the ability to fly frequently with the 
low costs offered by the new launch services, 
you have the tool you need to pry open the 
capital markets.
REDUCING PAYLOAD COSTS
The drop in launch costs should help in 
another significant way   it should finally 
force a drop in payload costs. The cost per 
kilogram of payload is already out of line
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with the cost per kilogram of transportation*
Far too much is being spent to lighten 
payloads and provide for reliability through 
redundancy. We all know that you pay by the
pound for overnight mail* But would you pay 
$5 # 000 dollars to save a few pounds and $50
dollars on the shipping fee? Of course not, 
but that is what is happening in aerospace 
programs where payloads can cost over $100,000 
per kilogram. Payload designers are still 
working as if they were going to launch on 
Vanguard; even on today's most expensive 
vehicle it doesn't make sense*
If allowed to use heavier, less expensive 
materials it is possible to build spacecraft
at a tremendous sayings* For example, 
beryllium structure is presently favored over 
aluminum structure for spacecraft because it 
weighs only half as much   unfortunately, it 
costs ten times more* Using MMI's launch cost 
to LEO, the price to launch one kilogram is 
approximately $1,300* If beryllium structure 
costs $40,000 per kilogram and aluminum 
structure $4,000 per kilogram, could you do 
better building a 1,000 kg beryllium 
spacecraft out of aluminum?
Yes. Even with the additional launch cost, 
doubling the weight of the spacecraft saves 
$28 million.
This argument extends to the system level as 
well* Assume that the stated, goal is to 
provide satellite communications services with 
99*99! percent reliability. You have a $5 
million satellite in hand that'is only 991 
percent reliable* The present approach, to 
achieving that last ninety nine one hundredths 
of a percent is to augment the existing 
satellitei increasing the cost of that 
satellite by a factor of ten. Total 
spacecraft costs have now become $50' million* 
With a Space Van launch of $24 million, the 
system, has a total price tag of $74 million*
Mill's suggestion is to launch a second 
satellite i < a copy of the first* This brings. 
reliability to the stated goal, but total 
spacecraft costs are now only $10 million* 
Two Delta class geosynchronous launches on, the 
Van would cost a total $48 million* In 
summary, the old way of doing things will cost 
$74 million for spacecraft and launch.; the new 
way of doing .things will achieve the same goal. 
for $58 million* You 1 re $16 million ahead of 
the game*
As launch, prices drop and the cost of delay is 
addressed, we will see more and, more small 
players able to enter the industry* Small 
companies are known for creative cost cutting 
and pay load costs- should be forced down. 
further* One company has successfully 
sub s 11,tu t ed equa 1 ly re 1 iab le , inexpens ive 
ma r i ne ins t rum en t s for aero s pa c e ins t rum en t, s   
The Amateur Satellite people and their
creative technical solutions are legendary   
including using a carefully folded $10 metal 
measuring tape as deployable antenna. Payload 
prices should drop and drop considerably.
CONCLUSION
Though this discussion has been about the 
needs of the user community, it is important 
to remember that their problems are also 
problems for the launch industry. This is 
what Gordon Woodcock of the Boeing company 
refers to as the N-squared problem. To get 
investors, launch services must prove that the 
vehicle offered is sound and the service 
proposed realistic. Proving oneself is the 
first N, the first variable. Then you must 
also prove that there are going to be 
customers to buy your launch services. That 1.s 
the second N. In an investor's eyes the two 
variables aren't just additive    they 
multiply into a much greater problem or N- 
squared. If the user community has problems, 
we have problems. The way launch companies do 
business directly effects their customers 1 
ability to get capital. If the users can't 
break out of the capital trap, neither can the 
launchers.
Fortunately, launch companies are not entirely
at the mercy of circumstance. They will 
continue to move away from their public sector
roots with competition providing both the
carrot and the stick needed for change. We 
will see increased access, improved, operations
and lower prices. Project time will be 
compressed and payload costs forced down. As 
risks and costs go down the private capital
 markets    who< already recognize the potential
*-"" will jump in for a, piece of the action.
The launch companies hold the answer. If 
allowed, to operate without interference in, a 
truly competitive arena, they will change to 
meet the demands of the marketplace. lot 
every company will he successful. But the 
industry as a whole' will be stronger-. The 
payload companies will finally he able to 
latch, onto the capital they need helping, in 
turn, the launch companies*
Some time ago industry observers predicted, 
that commercial space would boon, into a $60 
billion industry* A great many folks were 
disappointed when that did not 'happen, and. in
a few places, heads rolled, Some decided 
that,, since the industry wasn't performing as 
predicted, space was not and never would be a 
place for 'business* That is not true. The 
time line may have been estimated incorrectly, 
but not the potential* The transition from 
federal stepchild to commercial industry takes 
time* Given time, and room to grow freely, 
i. nnova t, ive bus ine s s e s wi 1,1 cr ea t e an ind as t ry 
that not only Meets previous expectations, but 
surpasses them.*
